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I.

statement of purpose
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the sensitivity of

Brazil's balance of payments (including its foreign debt) to
future changes in world economic conditions.

To accomplish this,

the determinants of the country's balance of payments will be
isolated and then empirically studied.

Based upon these results,

forecasts will be made under three different economic scenarios.
The intent will be to determine the affect that different sets of
world conditions have upon Brazil's foreign debt and trade
balance from 1987 to 1991.
The hypothesis of this study is that continued industrial
country growth, coupled with low world interest rates, will
produce annual balance of payment surpluses.

This will lead to a

decrease in Brazil's foreign debt over the next five years.

On

the other hand, if interest rates increase, followed by a world
recession, Brazil will experience significant trade deficits over
the next five years; this will severely undermine Brazil's
ability to service its foreign debt over the coming years.
By way of conclusion this paper will relate the implications
of Brazil's future balance of payments and foreign debt situation
to the success of democracy in the country.

In addition, some of

the positive steps that have been taken or that should be

taken

in ameliorating the external economic problem will be discussed.
They will include, a better understanding of the problem by the
industrialized countries, a new forum for re-negotiating the
Latin American debt, and specific policies that the Brazilian
government can adopt.

1

II. Economic History. 1970-1987
Brazil has the notorious distinction of having the largest
foreign debt of the developing countries, totaling 105.1 billion
dollars at the end of 1985. 1 This brief history will address two
main questions:

Why does Brazil have the largest foreign debt of

the developing countries?

What domestic affects has this

situation had on the country?

To begin to answer these two

questions three powerful external shocks to Brazil's economy and
to the world economy will be examined.

The first of these was

the oil shock of 1973, which substantially increased Brazil's
foreign debt and trade deficit.

Tne second was the oil shock of

1979-1980 following the Iranian Revolution, which intensified the
balance of payments deficit.

The final external shock was the

world recession of the early 1980's.

It is interesting to note

that the two main external shocks occurred in the seventies,
causing immediate decreases in the rate of growth in most of the
oil-importing countries, but the crisis in Brazil was only
evident in 1981. 2
This section will begin by examining why the crisis took
eight years (from 1973 to 1981) to affect Brazil, then go on to
examine what happened to the country from 1982 through early
1987. During this history it is important to keep in mind that in
1970 Brazil had a foreign debt of 4.9 billion dollars (or $13
billion in 1985 dollars) and by the end of 1985, it had a foreign
debt of 105.1 billion dollars. 3 A real increase of 709% over a
period of fifteen years (see Graph-1).

2

G- 1 B razilian Foreign De bt
110

(1970-1985)

100
90
,-...
.tII

80

~
~-

0

70

til
C

0

60

..0

'-'

....
..0

50

c

40

cp
0

Ol

'iii
L.
0

lJ..

30
20
10
0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985

Time (years)

1970-1979
The main shock to Brazil's economy was the OPEC oil embargo
of 1973.

At the time of the embargo, Brazil was the largest

importer of oil of the developing countries.

oil importing and

the setting of domestic oil prices is controlled by the Brazilian
government.

However, as the price of oil quickly and

consistently increased, the Brazilian government did not adjust,
or even attempt to adjust to the new, higher prices.

Instead,

the government concentrated on sustaining high rates of growth.
This attitude is clearly evidenced in the Braziiian government's
Second National Development Plan that was presented to the
country in 1975.

The Plan specified goals of both increasing

state sponsored investment and the maintenance of a rapid rate of
Yet the Plan did not address the issue of
adjusting to the new, higher oil prices. 4
growth (see

Graph~2).

The immediate result was that Brazilian imports went from
6.2 billion dollars in 1973 to 12.6 billion dollars by 1974. 5

A

large portion of this increase was due to oil imports, which went
from 986 million dollars to 3.2 billion dollars by 1974 (see
Graph~3).6

This meant that in a one year time span oil imports

went from 16% of total imports to 25%.

In addition, the rise in

oil prices increased industrial production costs worldwide,

leading to sUbstantial increases in world prices which led to an
increase in level of Brazilian imports.

The sharp increase in

imports was paid for with large increases in foreign borrowing.
Very convenient for Brazil and the other developing countries was
the large supply of Petro-Dollars that became readily available

3
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through the western banks.

The American and European recessions

that followed the first oil shock led the Western banks to seek
out new lending markets in which to re-circulate their new PetroDollars. 7
Many economists argue that the current debt situation is due
in large part on the over-eagerness of Western bankers to push
their money, in the form of loans , onto developing nations.
Although this is a very valid criticism of the bankers, they are
by no means the only ones at fault.

Clearly, Brazil and most

developing countries were borrowing money willingly to support
their continued growth at the expense of future generations.
Therefore, the Brazilian military government deserves as much, if
not more, of the blame than do the Western bankers.

Also, during

the early nineteen-seventies, low real rates of interest made
these loans extremely attractive. 8 Yet the rise in the real
rates of interest during the early part of the eighties,
increased dramatically the debt servicing burden.

This lead to a

re-assessment of the effectiveness of the huge scale foreign
borrowing that was undertaken in the seventies.
In 1973, General Ernesto Geisel became President of Brazil
(1973-1979) .

President Geisel was committed to raising real

wages (which in fact rose during the 1970's) and to sustaining
rapid growth.

Throughout the seventies, domestic industrial

costs increased, both because of the rise in fuel prices and
because of the rise in wages. 9 The rise in costs led to
increases in consumer prices.

This further increased wages, and

caused the inflation rate to spiral upwards.

Furthermore, real

Brazilian growth was made possible by Brazil ' s avoidance of its
4

transfer problem to the OPEC nations, through increased foreign
borrowing.

By doing this, the Brazilian military government

passed the burden of the increased oil prices and increased
foreign debt onto future governments and future generations. 10
It is clear that in many respects the military government's
economic action was politically motivated: . by maintaining high
growth rates, the military was able to stay firmly in power (see
Graph-2) •
A large proportion of the new borrowed mohey was used to
modernize Brazil, by investing it in capital-intensive and
technologically intensive projects.

.However, some of this money

was invested inefficiently in controversial projects.

Two

examples of this were the construction of the nuclear power plant
in Angra dos Reis and the Trans-Amazonic Highway project. ll
Nonetheless, with hindsight it has become clear that many of the
investments made in the seventies, which at the time seemed
dubious, were in fact very wise and insightful.

Two good

examples of this are the alcohol-fuel program and domestic steel
product·ion.
1979-1982
In 1979, General Joao Figueiredo became President of Brazil
(1979-1985).

During this year Brazilian exports totalled $15.2

billion and imports totalled $18.1 billion (see Graph-4).12
foreign debt stood at $51.4 billion.

The

At GATT's request President

Figueiredo removed the government tax incentives and credit
subsidies to exporters.

He also

be~an

devaluating the currency

at frequent intervals; this is known as mini-devaluations.

5
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President's intent was to deflate the currency, making Brazilian
exports more competitive.

The devaluations accelerated Brazil's
domestic rate of inflation. 13
During 1978 and 1979, a series of droughts and frosts
destroyed a large part of the domestic agricultural production.
Because of this Brazil began importing some of its food staples,
such as beans and rice, from abroad.

To encourage domestic food

production, the government increased the prices of food .
increases boosted the short "run inflationary rate.

These

In addition,

the fall of the Shah of Iran precipitated the second oil crisis
which further increased the domestic inflation rate, the foreign
debt, and the trade deficit. 14
In 1980, seven years after the first oil shock the Brazilian
government recognized that the economy was approaching a crisis
situation, due to Brazil ' s failure to adjust to the oil price
shocks of the seventies.

The government began the year by

limiting the mini-devaluations to small but frequent increments,
with the intent of slowing the inflation rate.

The government

strengthened its control over domestic prices, which prevented
producers from passing on the costs of the devaluations, as well
as the rising inflation rate, onto the consumers. 15
By the second quarter of 1980, it was obvious that the
government would have to take drastic measures to alleviate the
impending crisis.

The government took two main steps:

First, it

substantially reduced expenditures and investment by state-owned
corporations.
budgets.

This involved reductions of up to 15% in their

with the intent of reducing aggregate demand and

inflation, the government also reduced its spending in other
6

fiscal areas .

Second, a wage indexing policy, designed to slow

wage increases, was instituted.

The government also temporarily
eliminated the currency devaluations. 16
The results of this limited austerity program were fairly
favorable.

Brazilian growth for 1980 remained high; real Gross

Domestic Product grew by 7.9%.

A large part of this growth

stemmed from an agricultural recovery after the frosts and
droughts that occurred during 1978 and 1979.

In addition,

industrial production increased because of a strong demand for
durables.

This increase was due to increased inflationary

expectations and the existence of relatively cheap domestic
credit.

Two serious problems would remain for the coming years:

the domestic savings rate was declining and inflation was
increasing.

The domestic inflation off-set any export trade

benefits that might have resulted from the domestic currency
devaluations. 17
Recession. 1981-1982
During 1981 and 1982, the Brazilian government made slowing
the domestic inflation rate its primary economic goal, even at
the expense of slower overall growth.

To accomplish this goal

the government used a combination of fiscal, monetary and incomes
policies.

The fiscal measures were designed- to decrease

aggregate demand.

They included:

limiting the growth of state-

owned corporations, decreasing government spending on wages and
fringe benefits, and delaying payment to government suppliers for
goods that were provided.

On the monetary side, the government

tightened the money supply (only allowing it to grow at a rate

7

slower than that of the inflation) , tightened consumer credit,
and increased the frequency of the currency devaluations.
Finally, on the incames side, the government re-introduced full
indexation, tightened its previous wage indexing policy and
maintained high domestic energy prices. 18
By the end of 1981, the results of the government's action
were clearly evident.

Real Brazilian GOP decreased by 1.6% over

the previous period (see G_5).19

Industrial output decreased by

5.4%, and unemployment reached a high of 9.0%.

The exception to

this downward trend in growth was in the agricultural sector,
which grew by 6.8% . 20

The outcome for 1982 indicated that

Brazil's policy of slowing inflation had been successful, with an
inflation rate down from 110% in 1981 to 91.2%.21

Also, the

balance of payments situation improved, and Brazil actually
experienced a trade surplus in 1981, the "first since 1977. 22
It is notable that Brazil experienced a trade surplus while
the world economy was in a severe economic recession.

The

questions at this point are how was this achieved and what
implications does this have for the future balance of payments
situation?

The increase in exports was due to the re-

introduction of export incentives.

Also, the weakness in the

domestic market encouraged Brazilian exporters to look abroad.
In terms of imports, the decrease in Brazilian growth and an
effective import-substitution program led to a decline in
imports.

The two factors that had the greatest affect in

decreasing imports were increased domestic oil production and
substitution from gasoline to alcohol-fuel (produced from sugar
cane) for powering automobiles (see Graph-6).23
8
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The Brazilian economic situation, at of the end of 1982, was
characterized by four important events.

First, the Brazilian

debt reached an astoniShing level of 91 billion dollars. 24
Second, imports were drastically cut.
reduced its investment expenditures.

Third, the government
Finally, Brazil, and most

of the other developing countries were forced to renegotiate
their foreign debts due to illiquidity problems. 25 Even with
this pessimistic scenario, the long term outlook for Brazil
remained very favorable.

Brazil's diversified export structure,

both in terms of the commodities exported and their destinations,
would be a great asset to the country once the world recession
ended. 26

Brazil's domestic energy policy began achieving

impressive results.

They included increased domestic fuel

production, increased alcohol-fuel production, and the opening of
the Itaipu power plant (the world's largest hydroelectric power
plant).27

In terms of demographics, as of 1982, the situation

also looked very favorable.
was steadily declining:

The average population growth rate

from 3% in the 1950's to 2.9% in the

1970's, and finally to an average growth rate of only 2% . in the
1980's.28
1983-1984
At the beginning of 1983 Brazil implemented an austerity
program designed by the IMF.

It was designed to coax the IMF and

the western commercial banks, involved in international lending,
to renew lending to Brazil.

The program included a 30%

government imposed maxi-devaluation of the cruzeiro, a reduction
in the public deficit and new wage restrictions.

9

The wage

restrictions were designed to slow the inflation rate. They
prevented wages from increasing as quickly as the domestic price
index.

The devaluation of the currency was designed to increase

exports, by making their relative prices more competitive, and to
decrease imports, by increasing the relative prices of imports. 29
This program convinced the IMF and the western banks that
Brazil was well on its way towards stabilizing its economy.
February, a new lending agreement was arranged.

In

The agreement

specified that Brazil would receive 5.5 billion dollars from the
IMF over the next three years, and 4.4 billion dollars from the
western commercial banks.

In addition, 4 billion dollars of

medium and long-term loans were rescheduled over an eight year
period. 30
However, by May, Brazil had fallen behind on its interest
payments.

It became obvious that the country could not mainta'i n

its ambitious austerity program.

Therefore, the IMF suspended

its loan payments from the February agreement, and the commercial
banks quickly followed suit. 31
In late June, with the internal political, social, and
economic situation quickly becoming worse, the government put
together its own austerity program.

The program focused '

specifically on the federal budget deficit and the iriflation
rate.

To decrease the deficit, the government substantially

reduced fiscal spending., This was accomplished by reducing the
subsidies given to the state-owned corporations.

The

government's intention was to eliminate the budget deficit by the
end of 1984.

with respect to inflation, the government attempted

to maintain an inflation rate at 5% per month for the rest of
10

1983.

To accomplish this, a series of five wage control decree-

laws (a decree law is a law that is passed by the President,
without submitting it to the congress) were imposed;32 but, these
measures were not effective in slowing the rapidly increasing
inflation rate (see Graph-7).
The year ended with the international bankers giving Brazil
a new loan of 6.5 billion dollars. 33 Although this new loan
temporarily stabilized Brazil's external economic sector, the
various austerity programs, implemented during 1983, had some
very adverse affects on Brazil's political, social, and domestic
economic situation.

The most blatant illustration of the growing

domestic ills were the supermarket sackings in 1983; there were
over 900 sackings by the hungry and jobless - or an average of
three supermarket sackings per day.

On the political front, the

military threatened to end the democratic reforms that were being
carried out unless President Figueiredo's administration
stabilized the situation. 34
During 1984, the government's austerity program began to
produce considerable improvements to
situation.

~e

balance of payments

Exports increased 25%" for the year, and imports

decreased 10% for the year.

By March, Brazil was experiencing

monthly trade surpluses of approximately 1 billion doll.a rs.
These favorable results allowed the government to liberalize
imports, thus providing for future growth. 35 Because of the
increase in exports and the decrease in imports, Brazil
experienced a current account surplus (its first since 1965) of
42 million dollars.

This occurred only two years after Brazil

11
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experienced its worst current account deficit ever, one of 16
billion dollars. 36

In addition, by the end of the year, Brazil
paid all of the accumulated arrears on its foreign debt. 37
The current account surplus resulted in large part from
Brazil's aggressive import sUbstitution policy, most notably in
the area of fuel imports.

Fuel substitution reduced Brazil's

dependence on the OPEC countries and contributed to this account
surplus (see Graph-8).

By the end of 1984, Brazil was producing

50% (500,000 Bls./day) of its oil needs.

This was a significant

improvement over the early 1970's when Brazil produced only 20%
of its oil needs and had to import the other 80%.38
Brazil's efforts at substituting alcohol-fuel for gasoline
were very successful and also served to decrease Brazil's
dependence on foreign oil.

Due to the government's active

support in the research and production of alcohol-fuel,
production reached a level of o145,000Bls./day in 1984.

In the

automobile production sector, 80% of the new automobiles produced
in 1984 were alcohol fueled. 39
During this period, the

gove~nment

continued to reduce and

or eliminate subsidies that it had previously been providing.
an attempt to try to further slow inflation, wage adjustments
were partially de-indexed.

Finally, the military government of

President FigUeiredo opened the way for a civilian president to
assume the leadership of the country in 1985. 40
Transition to Democracy. 1985-1987
After 21 years of military rule Brazil elected its first
civilian president, Tancredo Neves.

On the eve of President

Neves ' inauguration he underwent emergency surgery and died
12
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before being sworn in as President.

Jose sarney, the elected
Vice President, became the acting President of Brazil. 4l
President Sarney had two main objectives.

First, he wanted

to continue Brazil's political reorganization towards a more
democratic system.

This included direct congressional elections

in 1986, rewriting the constitution in 1986, and tentative direct
presidential elections in 1988.

Secondly, he redirected the

government's economic focus from a policy which was traditionally
oriented towards the external sector, to one that would address
the country's pressing social and economic problems. 42
In order to implement his new economic policy, President
Sarney appointed nilson Funaro, an industrialist from Sao paulo,
as the new Finance Minister.

Funaro included on his staff many

economists from the non-Marxist left.

Had the military still

been in power, an action such as this one would never have been
tolerated.

Funaro also brought to his job a new ideology about

Brazil's economy that was significantly different from the one
that the previous military governments had advocated.

It was

characterized by an unwillingness to submit to IMF programs that
would slow economic growth, and refusal to slow the inflation
rate at the cost of increased unemployment.

In addition, the

first economic priority became the domestic economy.43

An

excellent example of this new ideology was the speech that
President Sarney gave at the united Nations on September 23 ,
1985:
Brazil will not pay its foreign debt with
recession, nor with unemployment, nor with
hunger •.• a debt paid for with poveilY is
an account paid for with democracy.
13

••• the existing scenario must be re-assessed.
It must be restructured. BecaUse it is
unfair. And anything that harbors the germ
of injustice, of the absurd, cannot survive. 45
The resulting economic situation for 1985 was not
surprising, keeping in mind the government's new priorities:
inflation averaged about 200% for the year and the internal debt
reached 30 billion dollars.

In addition, Brazil achieved an

astounding 8.3% GDP growth for the year.

On the other hand, the
demand for imports increased because of this high growth. 46
The year 1986 began very pessimistically for Brazil.

During

the first two months President Sarney's government increased
fiscal spending considerably, using money that it did not have.
This led to an increase in the federal budget deficit.

The first

two months also witnessed an increase in the real rates of
interest, which caused a rapid decrease in industrial investment.
Inflation reached an astronomical annual rate of 500% for January
and February.

During this period the United states and the other

industrial countries began pressuring Brazil to adopt an IMFbacked austerity program. 47
On February 28, 1986, the Brazilian government took drastic
measures to alleviate the economic situation.

President Sarney

announced The Cruzado Plan, an economic stabilization program.
The program was divided into three main objectives:

the

elimination of automatic indexation, the freezing of all prices,
and the replacing of the Cruzeiro with the Cruzado 'as the
Brazilian unit of

cu~rency.

This new currency, the Cruzado, was

valued at 1,000 times the old currency.48
The Cruzado Plan had a number of immediate effects on the
14

economy, some favorable and others, unfavorable.

For the

consumers, the price freezes significantly increased their
purchasing power.

This led to a massive spending frenzy.

Compounding the consumption spree was a decrease in the real rate
of interest.

This encouraged people to take their money out of
savings and spend it on consumer goods. 49
The unexpected consumption drive brought on many internal

problems.

First of all, the demand for consUmer goods quickly

outstripped the supply.

This led to increased employment, but it

also created major shortages.

By the middle of 1986, shortages
of beef, milk and other consumer goods became commonplace. 50

Secondly, many suppliers of parts, raw materials and food
products began withholding their goods, instead of selling them
at the depressed prices.

In an attempt to discourage this type

of behavior, the sarney administration imported meat and milk
from abroad; the administration also imposed a mandatory
slaughter of domestic cattle.

Thirdly, the price freezes, and

the shortages that resulted, led to a significant rise in the
"black" market for consumer goods, even at their official place
of sale.

To address this problem, the government published

comprehensive tables listing the official prices for all consumer
goods.

The consumers were encouraged to "police" the prices, and

report any irregularities to the government agency which was
created to address this specific problem. 51
Finally on November 21, 1986, the Brazilian government came
out with The Cruzado Plan II, designed to work out the problems
in the original plan.

The new plan increased taxes and cut

15

federal expenditures.

It also postponed investment in many of

the state-owned corporations in order to decrease fiscal
spending.

In an attempt to stimulate trade, export incentives

were re-introduced by the government, in the form of lower income
taxes for exporters. 52
To rectify many of the shortage of goods, prices were readj usted and then re-frozen.

Finally; to slow the inflation

rate, the method of determining the inflation index was changed.
The standard income level, that had previously been used to
determine the average basket of goods, was upgraded.

Therefore,

an increase in the price of a good in the basket would not have
as much of an effect on the index of inflation as it previously
had. 53
By the end of December, however, two occurrences seemed to
signal the "untimely death" of the Cruzado Plan: . an average
annual price increase of 70% for the months of November and
December, and the re-introduction of full indexation by the
government.

On the external front, the trade surplus fell from

over $1 billion in July, to monthly surpluses of $100 million for
November and December.

To compound matters, Brazil's foreign

reserves decreased substantially in these last two months of the
year. 54
At present, there is growing concern among Brazilians that
the government has lost control of the economy.

Evidence of this

is the inflation rate, which increased by 16% during January of
this year. 55

Because of the deteriorating situation, the near

term outlook for Brazil has quickly become very pessimistic.

In

addi tion to seeking new loans from its creditors, the government
16

is also considering signing what it calls a "social pact", with
its citizens;

This pact would entail a willing attempt by all

Brazilians to help slow the inflation rate.

To do this, workers

would agree not to ask for wage increases and producers would in
turn agree not to raise their prices.

However, the government

has not yet proposed a concrete plan on how it will address the
current situation. 56

17

III.
A.

The model
Summary
What follows is an overview of the model used in this stUdy .

The section following this one will explain in detail the
procedure used in this model and the results obtained.

In the

third section the data sources will be explained.
1) XGt = -18.6 + 3.5 OECDt + 1.4 DOLt + .005 Pt
XG t = Natural log. of exports of goods in year t.
OECDt = Natural log. of the industrial countries real GDP level in
year t.
DOLt= Natural log. of the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR) in year t.
Pt = Natural log. of world inflation in year t.
2) XS t = .10 XG t
XS t = Exports of services in year t.
3) MNO t = -5.1 + 2.3 BGDPt - 0.7 RAt + 1.4 DOLt - 0.9 Pt
MNO t = Natural log. of Brazilian non-oil imports in year t.
BGDP t = Natural log. of the Brazilian real level of GDP in year t.
RAt = Natural log. of the real domestic exchange rate (Cr./$) in
year t.
DOLt= Natural log. of the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR) in year t.
Pt = Natural log. of world inflation in year t.
4) MVO q = 107.9 - 1.9 Q
MVO = Volume of oil imports per quarter (Q) .
Q= ~ime per quarter .

MS t = Imports of services in year t.
MO t = Value of oil imports in year t.
MNO t = Value of non-oil imports in year t.
6) Tt = -26.0 + 9.4 Time
7) DFl t = DFI 1985
Tt = Transfer payments to Brazil in year t.
DFl t = constant flow of direct foreign investment into Brazil.
Ht =
Mt =

Natural log. of non-gold reserves in year t.
Natural log. of total imports in year t.
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I t = Interest paid on the foreign debt in year t.
f= Fraction of the debt at fixed interest rates.
i= Fixed interest rate charged on f.
rt= Interest rate charged on the variable into portion of the
debt in year t.
Dt= Total foreign debt in year t.
10) a=A1986/(DLT1985)
a= Constant amortization rate.
A1986= Net amortization paid on the debt in 1986.
DLT= Long term debt in 1985.
The following equations are identities:

Ct=
Xt =
Mt=
It =
Tt =

11) Ct = Xt - Mt - It + Tt
Current account balance in year t.
Total exports in year t.
Total imports in year t.
Interest paid on the debt in year t.
Transfer payments in year t.

12) Lt= -C t + At + HC t - DFI t
Lt = Required new net lending in year t.
Ct = Current account balance in year t.
~= Net amortization payments in year t.
HC t = Change in non-gold reserves in year t.
DFI t = Direct foreign investment in year t.
13) Dt = (D t - l - At) + Lt
Dt = Total foreign debt at the end of year t.
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B.

Presentation

The conceptual basis of this model is derived from William
Cline, International Debt: Systemic Risk and policy Analysis. 57
Cline's model forecasts the balance of payments and foreign debt
of the 19 largest debtor countries.

The model that follows was

adapted to address Brazil's current external economic situation.
The primary variables of concern are exports and imports of
goods.

However, a complete analysis of the Brazilian situation

requires looking at all capital flows into and out of Brazil.
The model presented here includes 13 dependent variables
(see Table M-1).

Seven of these are derived from behavioral

relationships, and three are obtained directly from identities.
In addition, two of the variables are estimated as constants and
one is calculated as an approximation.

The results from this

model will then be used to forecast Brazil ' s external economic
situation for the years 1987 to 1991.
Table M-1
List of the Dependent Variables
Symbol

Definition

Equation #

XG t
XS t

Natural log. of exports of goods · in year t.
Export of services in year t •.

1
2

MNOt
MVO g
MS t

Natural log. of non-oil imports in year t.
Volume of oil imports per quarter.
Import of services in year t.

4
5

T
DtIt
Ht

Transfer payments received in year t .
Direct foreign investment in year t (=DFI 1985 ).
Natural log. of non-gold reserves in year t.

8

It
a

Interest payments in year t.
Constant rate of amortization.

9
10

C

Current account balance in year t.
Required new net lending.
Foreign debt in year t.

11
12
13

Ltt
Dt
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3

6

7

Exports of Goods
This equation estimates the elasticity of demand for
Brazilian exports.

It is assumed that the annual supply of

Brazilian exports equals the demand.

The elasticity of demand

for Brazilian exports is a function of the industrial countries
real income level, the dollar exchange rate per major currency,
and the world inflation rate:
XG= f(OECD, DOL, P)
The demand for Brazilian exports is a function of the OECD
countries real income level because the industrial countries
import approximately 60%S8 of Brazil's total exports. In
addition, the OECD's real income level influences world growth
and therefore indirectly affects the demand for the other 40% of
Brazil's exports.
The demand for exports is also dependent on the relative
purchasing power of the dollar.
rate.

This is determined by the $jSDR

Finally, export demand is also a function of the world

inflation index.
The following equation is estimated by taking the natural
logarithms of both sides, and the Cochrane-Orcutt technique was
used.

i) XGt - -18.6 + 3.S OECD t + 1.4 DOLt + O.OOS Pt
SE=

3.0

0.8

0.7

DW=1.7(using Corc.=Orc.)
N=26
Yrs.=1960-1985

0.003

F-stat(3,21)=Sl

R2=.88
adjR 2=.86

XG t = Natural logarithm of Brazilian exports of goods in year t.
OECDt = Natural log. of the industrial countries' real GDP level
in year t.
D0Lt= Natural log. of the dollar exchange rate ($jSDR) in year t.
Pt = Natural log. of world inflation in year t.
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In order to obtain this export equation a number of other
independent variables - the real domestic exchange rate and a
time trend variable - were included in the original estimation
procedure.

But because their t-statistics were insignificant,

indicating that the parameters had no affect on exports, they
were not included in the final equation.
XGs exports of goods
OECD- industrial countries ' GDP level
~_united states dollar eXChan.g e rate, $/SDR
~eal Brazilian exchange rate (Cr./$).

~

-+~ D R

Table M-2
Exports of Goods
(1960-1985)
Independent Variables

Regression ·

a

OECD

DOL

P

RA

Time

Summary
Statist;i,cs
DW
adjR 2

(Cochrane-Orcutt technique)
-19.2
(-2.1)

2.4
(1. 2)

1.8
(3.7)

1.5 -.15
(2.1) (-0.9)

a-2

- 13.0
(-5.2)

1.0
(2.2)

1.9
(4.4)

1.1 -.15
(6.5) (-0.9)

1.9

. 98

a-3

-18.6
(6.1)

3.5
(4. i)

1.4
(2.1)

.005
(1. 6)

1. 7

.86

a-I

*

~

1. 9

.97

\

In parenthesis are the t-statistics of the coefficients.
The natural logarithm of exports was regressed on the

natural logarithms of the following independent variables:

the

OECD countries' GDP level, the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR) , the
world inflation index, the Brazilian real exchange rate, and a
term to test for time trends.

Because the t-statistic for the

independent variable time was -0.7 with 21 degrees of freedom (a
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50% level of significance) there was not enough evidence to
refute the null hypothesis that time had no affect on exports.
Time was therefore dropped from equation (a-I) and the export
equation was re-estimated (eqn. a-2).
In equation (a-2) the real Brazilian exchange rate (Cr./$)
did not produce enough evidence, a t-statistic equal to -0.9 with
22 degrees of freedom (a 40% significance level), to refute the
null hypothesis that the Brazilian exchange rate had no affect on
exports.

Although, intuitively, the Brazilian exchange rate

should have had an affect on exports, in Brazil's case, domestic
inflation increased faster than the currency devaluations.

The

currency therefore appreciated consistently throughout the years
in question (see Appendix Table A-I); this prevented the
cruzeiro/Dollar exchange rate from having a significant affect on
increasing the level of exports.
The independent variable, Brazilian domestic exchange rate,
was dropped from equation (a-2) and the export equation was then
re-estimated.

The final result was equation (a-3), which is also

equation #1.

r------ In

the absence of changes in the independent variables,

exports will decrease by 18.6% annually.

On the other hand, real

growth in the OECD countries will cause a 3.5% increase in
Brazilian exports for each percentage point increase in the real
GDP level.

This variable has the most significant affect on the

demand for Brazilian exports.
The results show that world inflation will have a very small
affect on Brazilian exports:

0.005% for everyone percent

increase in world inflation.

However, the affect of changes in
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the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR) will outweigh the changes in the
world inflation rate and produce a significant change in exports.
An

increase in the dollar exchange rate ratio ($/SDR) means that

the dollar is depreciating.

In Brazil's case, a 1% dollar

depreciation will increase the export level by 1. 4%.

This

coefficient provides an indication of the dollars relative
purchasing power and the geographical distribution of exports.
If the dollar depreciates, Americans will import less from
abroad; yet for the Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians, among
others, it will become relatively cheaper to purchase Brazilian
goods.

Each percentage point depreciation will lead to a 1.4%

increase in exports.

This suggests that the demand for exports

as a function of the united states dollar is elastic.
In the next part of this paper, certain assumptions about
the future world economic situation will be made.

These

assumptions will be inputted into the demand elasticity equation
in order to forecast the percentage change in exports over the
next five years.

To then convert the resulting percentage change

into a level of exports, the following equation will be used:

Where:
GtE resulting level of exports in year t.
Gt - l = the level of exports in the year t-l.
XGt - the percentage change in exports in year t.
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Exports of Services
2) XSt= .10 XGt
Yrs.=1970-1983

N=14

XS t = Exports of services in year t.
XGt = Exports of goods in year t.
Exports of services can be generalized as a fixed proportion
of the level of goods exported due to the predominance of
transportation, shipping, and other service expenditures; these
expenditures are directly related to the annual level of exports
(see Appendix Table A-2).

This equation was adapted from a model
used by Carlos von Doellinger. 59 In his model· von Doellinger
calculates the net payment of services as a fixed proportion of
trade over time.

However, this model estimates the exports and

imports of services separately.

This simplifies the presentation

of the model and of the forecasts.
Imports of Goods
This equation estimates the Brazilian elasticity of demand
for non-oil imports.

It is assumed that the demand for imports

always equals the supply.

The demand for non-oil imports is a

function of the Brazilian real income level, the real domestic
exchange rate, the dollar exchange rate ($/SDR), and the world
inflation index:
M= f(BGDP, RA, DOL, P)
The demand for imports is dependent upon the domestic real income
level.

It is also influenced by the relative purchasing power of

the Cruzeiro (or now the Cruzado) with respect to the dollar.
In addition, demand for imports will also be influenced by the
relative value of the dollar with respect to the other major
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currencies.

Finally, demand is also a function of the world

inflation index.
- 0.7 RAt + 1.4 00Lt - 0.9 Pt
0.7
0.3
0.2
F-stat(4,17)=111.5
R2=.96
DW~1.6 ( using Corc.-Orc. )
Yrs . -1963-l985
adjR 2=.95
N-23

3) MNOt= -5. 1 + 2.3 BGDPt
SE~
3.4
0.4

MNO t = Natural log. of Brazilian non-oil imports in year t.
BGOP = Natural log. of Brazilian real level of GOP in year t.
RAt-t Natural log. of the real domestic exchange rate (Cr.j$) in
year t.
OOLt = Natural log. of the dollar exchange rate ($jSOR) in year t.
Pt = Natural log. of world inflation in year t.
This equation was estimated taking the natural logarithms of
both sides and using the Cochrane-Orcutt technique.
If there are no changes in the right hand variables, imports
will decrease by 5.1% annually.

This occurs because the

Brazilian government aggressively promotes import substitution
through. domestic protectionism and import sUbstitution programs .
An example of the first is the protection granted to Brazil's
computer industry; an example of the latter is the government
subsidies provided for alcohol-fuel production.
Each percentage point increase in the real Brazilian GOP
level increases imports by 2.3%.

Therefore, domestic GOP growth

of less than two percentage points will not ipcrease the total
level of imports; this is due to the substitution factor of -5 . 1%
per year.

On the other hand, real domestic GOP growth of a

magnitude gr eater than 2.2% will require a positive increase in
imports.

Imports are elastic with respect to growth because of

the need to impo"rt technologically advanced and capital-intensive
goods in order to sustain growth.
Because the Brazilian currency appreciated, in real terms,
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throughout the estimation period (see Appendix Table A-l) , the
independent variable real domestic exchange rate (RA) had a
significant affect on increasing the demand for imports.

The

real exchange rate, the Cruzeiro/Dollar ratio, takes into account
the domestic inflation rate; increases in this ratio denote a
depreciation of the currency.

If the Brazilian currency

depreciates by 1%, the demand for imports will fall by 0.7%. This
means that the relative dollar price of foreign goods to the
Brazilians has decreased, all other things remaining constant.
Yet, if the currency appreciates (the Cruzeiro/Dollar ratio
decreases), the demand for imports will increase because
Brazilians will now be able to purchase more foreign goods.
Similar to exports, dollar devaluations (increases in the
Dollar/SDR ratio) will increase Brazil's demand for imports, 1.4%
for every 1% devaluation.

Dollar devaluations indicate the

relative purchasing power that the dollar has in the world
markets.

Therefore, if the dollar exchange rate depreciates,

Brazil's demand for imports will increase.
Finally, increases in world inflation will cause a decrease
in the demand for imports (-0.9% for each 1.0% increase in world
inflation).

World inflation will increase the price that Brazil

has to pay for its foreign goods, making it necessary to either
manufacture some of the goods domestically or to decrease the
level of imports.
In order to forecast the future levels of non-oil imports ,
certain economic assumptions will be made in the following
section.

The import demand equation, developed here, will be
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used to determine the percentage change in non-oil imports during
the next five years.

To convert this percentage change into an

annual level, the following equation will be used:

Where:
Mt= the resulting level of non-oil imports in year t
the level of non-oil imports in year t-l
MNO t = the percentage change in imports in year t.

Mt_~=

oil Imports
4) MVO q = 107.9 - 1.9 Q
SE=
2.7
0.2
DW= 1.7 (using Corc.-Orc)
Yrs.-1979-l985 (quarterly)

F-stat(1,25)=140.3
N~28

MVO q = Volume of oil imports (in millions of barrels) per quarter.
Q= Time (per quarter).
Cline's model does not take into account the affect that a
change the in oil price will have upon the import level.

The

volume of oil imported is therefore estimated first, and from
this the value of oil imports is then calculated.

This allows

different assumptions about future oil prices to be tested.
In the absence of data on the volume of Brazilian oil
imports, the assumption is made that Brazil buys all of its oil
and oil by-products at the official Saudi Arabian petroleum price
per barrel.

This assumption is probably an accurate predictor of

the actual situation, because Saudi Arabia is the price setter in
the oil market.

Therefore, the price that Brazil pays for oil

will either be the Saudi price or one that varies simultaneously
with it.

The quarterly dollar value of oil imports is divided by

the average dollar price per barrel of petroleum, and the result
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is the number of petroleum barrels imported per quarter from
1979-1985 (see Appendix Table A-3).
1979 was chosen as the first year of this estimation because
the volume of oil imported by Brazil reached a peak that year and
has since consistently decreased.

As the oil import volume

equation indicates, there has been a definite reduction in oil
imports during the last seven years.

The results show that on

average oil imports decreased by 1.9 million barrels per quarter
(see Graph-9).

This is due to increased domestic production of

oil, and the successful alcohol-fuel program.
To forecast the value of future oil imports the following
equation was used:
MOt=MVOt*P B
MO t = Value of oil imports in year t.
MVOt- Volume of oil imported in year t.
P B= Forecasted dollar (price per barrel) of oil in year t.
The value of oil imports in year t will therefore be equal to the
volume of oil imported in year t multiplied by the forecasted
price of oil in that year.

This equation is used to test

different assumptions about future oil prices.
Imports. of Services

MS t = Value of services imported in year t.
MO t = Value of oil imports in year t.
MNO t - Value of non-oil imports in year t.
This equation is very similar to that of exports of
services, and is also adapted from von Doellinger's model. 60
Similar to the export of services, imports of services can be
generalized as a constant proportion of the import level due to
the predominance of transportation, shipping, and other service
29
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expenditures that are directly dependent upon the annual level of
imports (see Appendix Table A-2).
Transfer Payments
6) Tt - -26.0 + 9.4 Time
SE- 28 . 5
2.9
DWc2.0
F-stat(l,15)=11 . 3
Yrs.=1969-1985
N=17
Tt = Transfer payments to Brazil (in millions of dollars) in year
t.
Time= Year.
Transfers are payments that are made to Brazil from
individuals living abroad or from foreign organizations.
Examples of this are payments made by expatriates to relatives in
Brazil and money sent by an organization, such as the Mormon
Church, to Brazil.

Transfer payments to Brazil increase by 9.4

million dollars annually.

Although transfer payments will affect

the balance of payments situation only ,slightly (the average
annual level of transfer payments from 1980 to 1985 was only $130
million) 61, they are included in order to give a complete forecast
of capital flows into Brazil.
The data suggested that some type of positive trend existed
to transfer ' payments over time.

Transfer payments were therefore

originally regressed over the time period 1960-1985 .

The results

were as fOllows :
Tt = 4.8 + 3.7 Time
SE= 34.9 2.2
DW=2.0 (using Corc.-Orc. ) F-stat(l,23)=3.0
R2=.11
N=26
Yrs.=1960-1985
adjR 2=.08
Because of the poorness of fit to this line (adjR2=.08) and the

J

small t-statistic for the time coefficient (t=1.7), this equation
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was not used.

An estimation was then made using the data for the

years 1969-1985 which seemed to indicate a more conclusive trend.
The results for this period showed a more definite and conclusive
trend.

The later years were therefore used for this model.

Since the ultimate purpose of this model is to forecast, data
closer to the present should provide a better representation of
the current situation than data from earlier years.
Direct Foreign Investment
DFI t = Direct foreign investment (in millions of dollars.) in
year t.
7) DFI t -1,267
Direct foreign investment into Brazil was regressed over the
period 1969 to 1985, but the results were inconclusive in terms
of predicting DFI:
DFIt= 789.2 + 63.5 Time
SE=

~69. 3) (57.1)

DW=2.0 (using Corc.-Orc. )
N=17
Yrs.=1969-1985

F-stat(l,14)zl.2 R2~.08
adjR2=.02

Therefore in the absence of better results, direct foreign
investment for 1985 (1,267 million do1lars)62 is used as level of
DFI.

It is assumed that DFI stays at this level throughout the

period being forecasted.

1-- ' •

-
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Non-Gold Reserves
8) Ht

=

SE=

-2.0 + 1.1 Mt
2.3

0.3

DW=1.6 (using corc.-Orc. )
N=26 Yrs.=1960-l985

F-stat(l,23)= 17.8

R2=.44
adjR 2=.41

Ht = Natural log. of non-gold reserves in year t.
Mt= Natural log. of total imports in year t.

To estimate the affect that changes in the import level had
on the level of non-gold reserves, the natural logarithm of nongold reserves was regressed on the natural logarithm of imports.
Typically a country will increase the level of reserves that it
maintains as its imports increase.

This provides the country

with foreign capital that is used to purchase imports.
Alternatively, if imports decrease a country will generally
decrease its non-gold reserve level.

The results suggest that

Brazil will increase, non-gold reserves by 1.1% for every 1%
increase in imports.

If imports do not change reserves will

decrease by 2% per year; also for every 1% decrease in imports,
reserves will decrease by 1.1% in addition to this original 2%
decrease.
Interest Payments
9) It-(i) (f) (Dt _l )+(rt%+2.0%) [(l-f) (D t - l ) 1
I t = Interest paid on the foreign debt in year t.
f=.2l, Constant fraction of the debt at fixed interest rates.
i=l1. 4, Fixed interest rat'e charged on f.
rt=LIBOR, Interest rate charged on the variable interest portion
of the debt in year t.
Dt = Total foreign debt in year t.
This equation is an identity that William Cline devised to
calculate the interest owed on the foreign debt by a country in
time period t.

The foreign debt is not divided into its short
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term and long term components, as Cline had done, for the sake of
simplicity.

In addition, Cline subtracted from this equation the

interest received from Brazil's non-gold reserves.

This term

(interest on non-gold reserves) was not included because it was
not clear how to determine the interest received on reserves
during a given year.
The interest owed on the foreign debt is a function of the
previous year' s debt multiplied by the current year's London
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), plus

a2~

point spread.

The LIBOR

rate is used because it is the international lending rate, and
the rate that determines the interest owed on 79%63 (l-f) of
Brazil's foreign debt.

In Brazil's case the spread, over and
above the official lending rate, is approximately 2% pOints. 64
Originally this lending spread was determined as a function of
the degree of risk that a loan posed; currently, it is more a
function of a bank's minimum operating costs.
Twenty-one percent (f) of Brazil's foreign debt, determined
in the base year 1985, is quoted at fixed rates of interest. 65
These are loans that were made to Brazil at predetermined
interest rates and that do not change as the international
interest rate changes.

Both for the sake of simplicity and in

the absence of comprehensive data on Brazil's foreign debt, it is
assumed that all of the debt at fixed interest rates is quoted at
11.4%.

This is the average interest rate charged on Brazil's

foreign debt according to the World Bank. 66

33

Amortization Rate

a=.Ol, Constant net amortization rate.
million, net amortization paid on the debt
l.n 1986.
DLT=$95,857 million, long term debt at the end of 1985.

A1986=~954

To estimate the average amortization rate (a) Cline uses the
above equation.

The net amortization paid on the debt in 1986 is

divided by the long term debt at the end of 1985 (A1986/DLT1985)'
in order to determine the average rate paid. 67 To then forecast
the amortization payments, the previous year's long term debt is
multiplied by the amortization rate (a).

It is assumed for the

forecasts that the amortization rate (a) stays the same during
the forecasting period.

Identities Used For Forecasting
Current Account Balance

Ct =
Xt =
Mt =
It=
Tt =

11) Ct = Xt - Mt - It + Tt
CUrrent account balance in year t.
Total exports in year t.
Total imports in year t.
Interest paid on the debt in year t.
Transfer payments to Brazil in year t.
The current account balance measures the flow of dollars

into and out of the country.

It is equal to total exports minus

total imports (trade balance).

Interest payments are then

subtracted because they involve capital outflows.

Finally,

transfer payments are added back to this equation because they
are capital inflows ·.
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Required New Lending
12) Ltz -C t + At + HC t - DFI t
Lt= Required new lending in year t.
At = Net amortization in year t.
HC t = Change in non-gold reserves in year t.
DFI t = Direct foreign investment in year t.
New lending is a function of the current account deficit, if
one exists, plus the amortization paid on the debt.

Thechange

in reserves is added to the current account balance because
decreases in the reserve level will decrease the account deficit,
assuming one exits.

Finally, the level of direct foreign

investment is subtracted, also decreasing the current account
deficit.
It is assumed that if a balance of payments deficit occurs·,
Brazil will be able to borrow the necessary capital to keep its
payments in balance.

If the right hand side of the above

equation turns out to be zero, or a negative value, the
assumption is made that new lending will be zero.

It should be

noted that although Cline neglected to include amortization
payments in this equation, it is included here because it
represents an important source of capital outflows that should
not be overlooked in determining capital flows.
Foreign Debt
13) Dt=(D t - l -

At)

+

Lt

D = Total foreign debt in year t.
Net amortization payments in year t.
New lending in year t.

t
At=
Lt=

The debt at the end of year t will equal the previous years
debt, less the net amortization paid out,

plus any new lending.

Cline also neglects to take into account the fact that

35

amortization payments reduce a countries' foreign debt. Net
amortization payments were thus included in this equation (At) to
better estimate Brazil's future foreign debt.

C.

Data Sources
For the most part, the data used in this study came from the

International Monetary Fund, IFS Yearbook 1986.

Data was also

gathered from the specific sources cited in the tables and
footnotes of this paper.

Additional sources were the OECD's,

National Accounts 1960-1984 (for the industrial countries real
GDP level), and assorted monthly issues of the IFS (for the
levels of direct foreign investment into Brazil).

Also, the

Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Latin American
Economic outlook. Fall 1986, provided updated GDP data, and world
economic forecasts.

The data for the graphs in this paper came

from the following sources:
1) G-1 United Nations, ESLA, 1983 and 1975
World Bank, World Debt Tables 1985-1986
Brazilian Economic Department, Brazilian Economic Program,
(Aug. 1986)
2) G-2 IMF,IFS Yearbook 1986
Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, Latin American
Economic outlook, Fall 1986
3) G-3, G-5, G-6, G-7, G-8:
IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986
4) G-4 IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986 and February 1987
5) G-9 IMF, .il:2, assorted monthly editions.
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IY.

The FQrecasts. 1987-1991
The model developed in the previous section is used to

forecast Brazil's external economic situation under three
alternative sets of assumptions about the next five years, 1987
to 1991.

The year 1986 is also forecasted, because updated data

is not yet available, and for purposes of continuity in the
forecasting.

The results are three different sets of forecasts,

each based upon different assumptions about the future domestic
and world economic situation.
In the first forecast, the base case, the domestic and world
economic projections made by Wharton Econometric Forecasting
Associates are used to estimate Brazil's balance of payments
situation.

The results obtained under the base case scenario

provide the best estimation of what the actual balance of
payments situation will be during the next five years.
The second and third projection scenarios are hypothetical
situations.

The second is a pessimistic case, modeled after the

recession years of the early 1980's.

The third is an optimistic

case which simulates conditions of steady world growth.
The forecasts are designed not only to predict Brazil's
future external economic situation, but also to study the
sensitivity of the balance of payments to specific economic
changes.

This will be accomplished by comparing the resulting

forecasts from the two extreme scenarios (the pessimistic and the
optimistic) to the base case forecasts.

Finally, the

implications of these forecasts to the domestic economy will be
examined.
For reasons that were explained in the model section, the
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estimation of three of the dependent variables will not change as
the projections change.

They are transfer payments, direct

foreign investment (DFI), and the volume of imported oiL
However, while the volume of oil imported will decrease at a
constant rate, the value of oil imports will change as the
forecasted price of oil (per barrel) changes.
A.

Three Scenarios
1.

Base Case

The assumptions used in the base case come from the e·c onomic
projections made by the Wharton Econometric Forecasting
Associates.
favorable.
be high.

As Table F-l illustrates, the assumptions are
Industrial country growth and Brazilian growth will

While world inflation and international interest rates

will remain fairly stable.

In addition, the price of oil (per

barrel) will increase slowly over the forecasted period.
Table F-l
Base Case Assumptions

YEAR

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

OECD
Growth
% ch.

Br.
GDP
%ch.

Br.
ex. rate
%ch.

2.5
3. 0
2.9
2.3
3. 8
3.4

6.4
5.4
4.6
4.8
5.7
4.7

-10.1
-17.3
-0.8
3.4
2.4
3.1

Dollar'"
per SDR
% ch.
10.0
5.0
6.0
-0.8
-1.4
2.0

World'"
Infl.
% ch.
9.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0
7.0

LIBOR
lending
rate,%
6.5
. 6.5
7.3
8.3
· 7.8
. 7.5

Price
of oil
($'s/ BBL)
13.79
14.75
16 ;74
18.63
21. 03
23.65

Source: Wharton l conometric Forecast~ng Associates ( Wharton: Fall 1986
1Hypothetical data.
*positive (negative) changes in the exchange rate indicate currency
devaluations (appreciations).
Based upon these assumptions, the forecast for Brazil is
optimistic (see Table F-2).

Due to a sustained high level of
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exports and a stable level of imports, Brazil will experience
large trade surpluses.

Also contributing to this surplus will be

the decrease in oil imports.
Sizable annual trade surpluses, coupled with stable interest
rates will allow the country to pay the interest and principal on
the foreign debt during 1987, 1988 and 1989.

However, in the

last two years of the forecast, 1990 and 1991, Brazil will
require small sums of new lending (approximately $250 million
annually) to continue servicing its .foreign debt.

Nonetheless,

the foreign debt will decrease approximately $4.5 billion dollars
over the next five years.
Table F-2
BASE CASE RESULTS
(in millions of $'s)
1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

26,715
4.2
2,671

26,430
(1.1)
2,643

26,426
(0.0)
2,643

23,351
(11. 6)
2,335

21,664
(7.2)
2,166

20,827
(3.9)
2,083

8,538
23.0
2,755
2,710

10,257
20.1
2,499
3,061

11,092
8.1
2,327
3,221

10,664
(3.9)
2,023
3,045

10,458
(1. 9)
1.,645
2,905

10,462
0.0
1,130
2,782

15,383

13,256

12,429

9,954

8,822

8,536

143
1,267
8,206

153
1,267
9,362

162
1,267
9,858

171
1,267
8,867

181
8,120

190
1,267
7,502

FOREIGN LIABILITIES:
Int. Payments
9,576
Alnort. Payments
1,051
Foreign Debt
104,075

9,480
1,041
103,034

10,037
1,030
102,004

10,742
1,020
100,984

10,236
1,010
100,201

9,919
1,002
99,510

3,928
0

2,555
0

EXPORTS:
Goods
%ch.
Services
IMPORTS:
Goods
%ch.

oil

Services
TRADE BALANCE:
Transfers
DFI
Non-gold Reserves

ACCOUNT:
Net new lending

CURRENT

5,949
0

39

(616)
0

1,267

(1,232)
227

(1,194)

311

2.

Pessimistic Case

Under this scenario, the assumption is made that the
Industrial Countries (the OECD countries) experience a
recessionary period along with high interest rates (see Table F-3 ) .
It is assumed that the world recession precipitates a Brazilian
recession.

To make matters worse, the Brazilian currency will

appreciate (this increases imports).

In addition, world oil

prices will increase substantially, and the dollar will
consistently appreciate relative to the other major currencies.

Table F-3
Pessimistic Case Assumptions

YEAR

OECD
Growth
% ch.

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

2.5
1.5
-0.2
1.0
0.8
1.2

.

Br.
GDP
%ch.

I

I

6.4
0.9
-3.2
-1.5
0.2
1.0

Br.
ex. rate
%ch.
-10.1
-9.0
-12.0
-11.0
-2.0
1.0

Dollar
per SDR
% ch.
10.0
-7.0
-9.0
-5.0
-2.0
1.0

World
Infl.
% ch.
9.0
13.1
15.2
12.7
11.8
13.4

LIBOR
lending
rate,%

Price
of oil
($ I S/BBL)

6.50
9.20
12.15
l4.03
16.72
13.60

13.79
18.00
22.00
27.00
29.00
33.00

Source. Hypothet~cal data •
*positive (negative) changes in the exchange rate indicate currency
devaluations (appreciations).
The forecasts under this scenario are shown in Table F-4.
The OECD recession will decrease the demand for Brazilian exports
from $20 billion in 1987 to $7 billion in 1991.

Nevertheless,

Brazil will continue to experience small trade surpluses because
of a $4 billion decrease in non-oil imports over the next five
years.

The domestic recession will cause this decrease in

imports.
Due to a significant increase in the international interest
40

rate, and the small trade surpluses, Brazil will experience
sizable current account deficits.

This will force Brazil to take

out new loans, increasing the foreign debt by approximately $44
billion over the next five years.

The burden of servicing the

debt will be compounded by the increase in the interest rates and
by the increase in the level of the debt.

Table F-4
PESSIMISTIC CASE RESULTS
(in millions of U.S. $' s)
1986
EXPORTS:
Goods
%ch.
Services

1987

1988

1989

1990

199 1

26,715
4.2
2,671

20,548
(23.1)
2,055

14,009
(31.8)
1,401

10,922
(22.0)
1,092

8,897
(18.5)
890

7,746
(12.9)
775

8,538
23.0
2,755
2,710

6,974
(18.3)
3,049
2,406

4,858
(30.3)
3,058
1,900

3,922
(19.3)
2,932
1,645

3,268
(16.7)
2,268
1,329

2,805
(14.2)
1,577
1,052

TRADE BALANCE:

15,383

10,174

5,594

3,515

2,922

3,087

Transfers
DFI
Non-gold Reserves

143
1,267
8,206

153
1,267
6,896

1 62
1,267
5,159

171
1,267
4,453

181
1,267
3,719

190
1,267
3,173

FOREIGN LIABILITIES:
Int. Payments
9,576
Amort. Payments
1,051
Foreign Debt
104,075

11,700
1,041
103,034

13,984
1,030
108,260

16,301
1,083
118,902

20,431
1,189
134,228

19,756
1 ,342
148,895

(12,615)
11,724

(17,328)
16,516

(16,480)
16,009

IMPORTS:
Goods
%ch.

Oil

Services

CURRENT ACCOUNT:

Net new lending

5,949
0

(1, 374)
0
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(8,229)
6,256

3.

Optimistic Case

Table F-5
_I.
OPTIMISTIC CASE ASSUMPTIONS ,

YEAR

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

OECD
Growth
% ch,
2.5
4.0
4.5
4.5
4.8
4.3

Br.
.GDP
%ch.
6.4
9.0
10.8
8.7
8.8
8.5

Br.
ex. rate
%ch.
-10.1
3.5
4.0
6.0
7.0
9.0

Dollar
per SDR
% ch,

World
Infl.
% ch,

LIBOR
lending
rate,%

10.0
3.0
2.0
-1.0
2.0
0.8

9.0
10.0
10.5
8.9
9.0
10.0

6.5
6.0
5.9
5.5
6.2
5.• 8

Price
of oil
($' s/BBL)
13.79
13.00
12.80
13.20
12.50
13.00

Source: Hyp othet l.cal data.
*positive (negative) changes in the exchange rate indicate
currency devaluations (appreciations).
The assumptions made in this case are similar to those made
in the base case (see Table F-5).

Industrial country growth will

be in the range of 4.5%, and Brazilian growth will average about
9%.

Interest rates will remain stable, while oil prices will

decrease slightly.

In addition, world inflation will remain

fairly constant, and the Brazilian currency will devaluate
consistently over the forecasted period.
The results are presented in Table F-6.
this scenario is very auspicious for Brazil.

The forecast under
Exports will

average about $26 billion per year, while imports will remain at
approximately $10.5 billion.

This will produce annual trade

surpluses of over $13 billion.
Stable interest rates will decrease the cost of servicing
the foreign debt and permit Brazil to amortize a portion of its
debt.

This wil l decrease the level of the debt by
$6 billion
,

over the next five years.

In addition, Brazil will experience

current account surpluses in the range of $5 billion.
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This will

provide the country with extra capital to invest in the domestic
economy.

Table F-6
OPTIMISTIC CASE RESULTS
(in millions of $'s)
1986

EXPORTS:
Goods
%ch.
Services
IMPORTS:
Goods
%ch.
Oil
Services
TRADE BALANCE:

Transfers
DFI
Non-gold Reserves

~

1988

1989

1990

1991

26,715
4.2
2,672

26,621
(0.4)
2,662

26,622
0.0
2,662

25,502
(4.2)
2,550

25,769
1.0
2,577

25,155
(:2 • 4)
2,516

8,538
23.0
2,755
2,710

9,251
8.4
2,202
2,749

10,203
10.3
1,779
2,876

10,336
1.3
1,434
2,825

10,847
4.9
978
2,838

10,876
0.3
621
2,759

15,383

15,081

14,427

13,457

13, 683]

13,414

143
1,267
8,206

153
1,267
8,187

162
1,267
8,499

171
1,267
8,130

FOREIGN LIABILITIES:
Int. Payments
9,576
Amort. Payments
1,051
Foreign Debt
104,075
CURRENT ACCOUNT:
Net new lending

1987

181's,I'"
190
1,267
1,267
8,016
7,568
:-"""ill

", ,5').

9~9\

9,069
1,041
103,034

8,897
1,030
102,004

8,486
1,020
100,984

\8:
100
99,974

6,164
0

5,691
0

5,144
0

4,905
0

5,949
0
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5,051
0

B.

Sensitivity Analysis
What follows is an analysis of the sensitivity of Brazil's

balance of payments to changes in economic conditions.

This is

accomplished by comparing the optimistic forecast and pessimistic
forecast to the base case forecast.

The specific world factors

that will be analyzed are world interest rates, world oil prices
and changes in the industrial countries income level.

The

domestic changes that will be discussed are the Brazilian GDP
level and changes in the Cruzeiro-Dollar exchange rate.

The

effects of changes in these factors on the balance of payments
will then be contrasted with their consequences to the domestic
economy.

It is important to keep in mind that economic

circumstances which improve Brazil's balance of payments do not
necessarily also improve the domestic economic situation.

In

fact, tradeoffs between these two situations usually result.
Brazil's trade balance will be most influenced by changes in
the industrial countries income level.

As is evidenced by the

optimistic case, steady world growth will produce the largest
trade surpluses of the three scenarios due to the increased
demand for Brazilian goods.

The implications to the domestic

economy of steady world growth are favorable.

' The increased

demand for Brazilian exports will stimUlate the economy; this
will increase employment and increase the overall income level .
The drawback to this is that domestic growth will also increase
the demand for imports, thus reducing the trade surplus.
Since 79% of Brazil's debt is quoted at a variable interest
rate, changes in the LIBOR will have a significant impact on
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Brazil ' s future current account and debt level. I estimate that
each percentage point increase in the LIBOR. will cost Brazil $840
million in additional interest payments.

If the interest rate

increases to levels similar to those of the early eighties, the
interest owed on the foreign debt will approximately double in
the next five years.

This represents an annual difference of up

to $10 billion (see interest payments in Table F-4) .
Changes in the world oil prices will not have a significant
influence on the balance of payments during the next five years.
In the pessimistic case, the price of oil increased significantly
over the five years, while in the base case the price increased
only modestly.

Yet the difference in the level of oil imports

between these two scenarios is small in terms of its overall
effect on the balance of payments, not more than $900 million.
Even though low world oil prices will benefit the balance of
payments situation somewhat, the tradeoff is that they will
discourage domestic fuel production.
On the domestic side of the balance of payments situation, a
slowdown in the Brazilian growth rate will benefit Brazil by
decreasing the demand for imports.

However, the implications

for the domestic economy will be very adverse :

a decrease in

employment, a decrease in the general standard of living, and a
li.m it on future economic growth.

Changes in the Brazilian income

level present the most significant tradeoff between the balance
of payments and the domestic economy.

Nonetheless, a comparison

of the second and third scenarios indicates that it would be
preferable for the overall economic situation if both imports and
exports increase rather than for both to decrease.
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Brazilian currency devaluations will also produce a
tradeoff.

In the short run, a government imposed currency

devaluation will decrease the level of imports and possibly
increase the level of exports.
surplus.

This will increase the trade

The problem is that currency devaluations will cause

domestic inflation.

This inflation will in turn appreciate the

currency relative to the dollar, thus eliminating any trade
benefits from the original devaluation.

In addition, the

original gains to the balance of payments will have to be
contrasted with the costs to the domestic economy of higher
inflation.
It is clear from this set of simulations that certain future
economic conditions will be more beneficial to both the external
and internal economic situations than others will be.

It is also

clear that certain combinations of these factors will alleviate
Brazil's foreign debt and balance of payments situation, while
other factors will adversely affect the future situation.

A

comparison of the sensitivity of Brazil's balance of payments to
specific changes illustrates the complexity of the situation and
the often contrasting implications for the country's future
domestic economy. -However, the most beneficial circumstances for
both the balance of payments and the domestic economy will be
high and sustained industrial country growth rates, together with
low international interest rates, and steady Brazilian growth.
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V.

Conclusion
This study illustrates that Brazil's future balance of

payments and foreign debt situation are very dependent upon world
economic conditions.

The two most important factors affecting

the situation will be the industrial countries real income level
and world interest rates.

If interest rates remain low and

growth high, Brazil will experience considerable trade surpluses
over the next five years.

This will lead to an impressive

improvement in its foreign debt.

If on the other hand interest

rates increa.s e, and a world recession ensues, Brazil's debt will
increase substantially.
A separate conclusion of this paper is that oil imports will
have a very minor influence on the balance of trade in the next
five years, regardless of changes in the price of oil.

Although

the medium term outlook was not specifically examined in this
paper, the trend in oil imports suggests that it might be
possible for Brazil to become energy self-sufficient.

This

represents an important break with the seventies and early
eighties when Brazil was almost entirely dependent on foreign oil
and when changes in oil prices substantially increased the
country's foreign debt.
A. number of positive steps have been taken in addressing the
Latin American nations balance of payments and foreign debt
situation. The first is a new overall awareness of the Latin
American nations' problem.

Two examples of this are the Baker

Plan and the Bradley Plan. 68

Although they advocate very

different methods for improving the situation, both show a good
understanding of the problem.
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Nonetheless, a full understanding

of the costs that the monetary policies pursued by the
industrialized countries, in particular the united states, have
on the Latin American balance of payments and foreign debt
situation is still lacking.

For example, this study indicates

that each percentage point increase in the LIBOR will cost Brazil
approximately $840 million dollars in additional interest
payments.

Factors such as this one must be taken into account

when the industrialized countries' governments take fiscal and
monetary action.
The second important initiative is the Paris Club, an
informal organization created to provide a forum in which a
debtor country's government can negotiate its liabilities with
the creditor banks' governments. 69 If this is successful, it
will provide a broader economic and political framework for renegotiating foreign debts.

The Paris Club also seems to signify

a shift away from defining the debt problem as simply a conflict
of interests between debtor countries and creditors, to an issue
with much broader world implications.
On the domestic front, the Brazilian government must
continue to emphasize import substitution in order to improve its
balance of trade;

In addition, the country must suppress

nationalistic pride and aggressively seek out new foreign
investment.

This will provide new inflows of foreign capital,

and it will stimulate the domestic economy.

The government

should also seriously consider swapping equitx in some of the
state-owned corporations for portions of the foreign debt; this
is a new practice known as debt-equity swapping. 70
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In order for democracy to be successful in Brazil, a number
of very pressing problems will have to be addressed by the
Brazilian government.

The first is the rapidly deteriorating

economy; the governments first priority should be to bring the
economy

under control.

Second, various pressing social problems

will have to be dealt with in the near future.

They include a

high rate of unemployment, a high rate of illiteracy, a high
level of malnutrition, and a widening income gap.7l

The success

of democracy in Brazil will be dependent upon the government's
ability to manage both the domestic situation and at the same
time, the balance of payments (including the foreign debt)
situation.

To accomplish this, Brazil will need all the

political and economic support that the industrialized countries,
especially the u nited states, are able to provide.
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VI.

Appendix A - Data Tables

Table A-I
Brazilian Exchange Rate
Exchange
Rate
(Cr/$)
per. avg.
year

(1)

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

0.19
0.27
0.39
0.58
1.25
1.90
2.22
2.66
3.40
4 . 08
4.59
5.29
5.93
6.13
6.79
8.13
10.67
14. 14
18.07
26.95
52.71
93.13
179.51
577.04
1848.03
6197 . 00

Exchange
Rate
index

Brazilian
Wholesale
Price index

(1980=100)
(2)

(1980-100)
(3)

0.4
0.5
0.7
1.1
2.4
3.6
4.2
5.1
6.4
7.7
8.7
10.0
11. 3
11.6
12.9
15.4
20.2
26.8
34.3
51.1
100.0
176.7
340.5
1094.7
3505.8
11755.9

Format: UN, ESLAC.
Sources: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986 .
IMF, IFS Yearbook 1985.
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0.1
0.2
0.3
0.5
1.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
9.0
11.0
16.0
23.0
31. 0
48.0
100.0
208.0
400.0
1073.0
3606.0
11860.0

Real Exch.
Rate Index
(1980=100 )
(2)*100/(3 )
(4)
296
301
283
242
238
360
211
253
215
258
218
201
188
166
143
140
127
117
111
106
100
85
85
102
97
99

Table A-2
Exports and Imports of Services
Exports of Services

YEAR
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

Exports of
Services
(billions
of $'s)

Exports
of Goods
(billions
of $'s)

0.329
0.397
0.433
0.618
0.839
L080
L038
L224
L191
L465
L726
2.248
L791
L729

2.739
2.904
3 0991
6.199
7.951
8.670
10.128
12.120
12.659
15.244
20.132
23.293
20.175
2L899

Services
as Fraction
of Goods
0.12
0.14
0.11

0.10
0.11
0.12
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.10
0.09
0.10
0.09
0.08
0.10

Avq.

Imports of Services

YEAR

Imports of
Services
(in billions
of $'s)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

0.790
0.936
L155
1.629
2.370
2.513
2.609
2 . 802
2.864
3.764
4.834
5.109
5.365
4.165

Imports
of Goods
(billions
of $'s)
2.507
3.247
4.232
6.192
12.642
12.210
12.383
12.023
13.683
18.084
22.955
22.091
19.395
15.429

Services
as Fraction
of Goods
0.32
0.29
0.27
0.26
0 . 19
0.21
0.21
0.23
0.21

0.21
0.21
0.23
0.28
0.27
0.24

Avg.

Sources: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1986.
UN, ESLAC, assorted editions .
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Table A-3
Volume of oil Imports

Year
1979
I
II
III
IV
198.0
I
II
III
IV
1 981
I
II
III
IV
1982
I
II
III
IV
1983
I
II
III
IV
1984
I
II
III
IV
1985
I
II
III
IV
Source:

Value of oil
Imports
(in millions
of $' s)
(1)

Saudi Arabian
Price of
Petroleum
($/Barrel)
(2 )

Volume of
oil Imports
(in millions
of Bls. )
(1)/(2)
(3 )

1,187
1,5.03
1,935
2,293

$13.34
$14.54
$18 • .0.0
$22 • .0.0

89
1.03
1.08
1.04

2,513
2,747
2,685
2,387

$26 • .0.0
$28 • .0.0
$29.33
$31. 33

97
98
92
76

2,913
2,821
2,971
3,.018

$32 • .0.0
$32 • .0.0
$32 • .0.0
$34 • .0.0

91
88
93
89

2,698
2,682
2,833
2,664

$34 • .0.0
$33.29
$33.32
$33.29

79
81
85
8.0

2,27.0
2,234
2,277
2,1.07

$31. 57
$28.56
$28.58
$28.5.0

72
78
8.0
74

1,B14
2,.06.0
1,856
1,744

$28.6.0
$28.53
$28.53
$28.23

63
72
65
62

1,552
1,397
1,515
1,74.0

$28 • .0.0
$28 • .0.0
$27 • .0.0
$27 • .0.0

55
5.0
56
64

IMF, IFS, assorted monthly editions.
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